I.
Introduction
Even before the onslaught of its ruinous civil
war, Somalia was very poor by any standard. Today, it is in a much worse situation, and
the poverty and unemployment of its people have increased enormously. As a result of
Somalia's 16-year devastating civil war, and since the country has not yet witnessed any
meaningful political stability or economic development, the unemployment situation in
Somalia is especially heart-wrenching. It is a war that, according to UN reports, has
caused a massive destruction to the means of production and the natural and human
resources of the country.(1)
This deplorable unemployment situation is also believed to have been contributing,
immensely, to the equally bad situation of the civil strife with the existence of
thousands upon thousands of illiterate young men who have no any marketable skill,
whatsoever, and who use their guns as the only means of livelihood. This is so, because in
the opinion of some experts, Somalias internal conflict is essentially a fight over
scarce resources.(2) As the World Bank has
explained in a relatively recent report: "Illiterate gunmen saw war, plunder and
extortion as their only livelihood. Some businessmen [as well as warlords] were enriched
by war-related criminal activities such as weapons sales, diversion of food aid, drug
production and exportation of scrap metal." (3)
Or as the renowned British scholar on Somali affairs, Prof. I. M. Lewis, put it while
describing how Somalia has retrogressed in the past 20 years or so with the total
destruction of all its government institutions: "The political geography of the
Somali hinterland, consequently, closely resembled that reported by European explorers in
the 19th century with spears replaced by Kalashnikovs and bazukas." (4)
As such, if real security, stability, and a modicum of law and order are to be restored to
Somalia, whose economy has been almost totally destroyed, the leaders of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) have to step up to the plate and do their level best to tackle
the severe unemployment situation which now prevails in the country. The steps they have
lately been taking, with the support of the African Union peacekeeping forces, in terms of
collecting all kinds of weapons and destroying them - and, thus, pacifying the capital
city (Mogadishu) which currently experiences the worst insecurity situation in the country
- are very commendable and appropriate steps. However, they are not sufficient measures
and they should be complemented by equally decisive steps in the economic sphere
particularly in addressing the acute unemployment crisis.
II.
Current Unemployment Situation in Somalia
Let us now present some basic facts and figures
on Somalias economic situation. For the year 1985 for which reliable data are
available, Somalia's gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at US $880 million (for
neighboring Ethiopia, the figure is around 8 times as much), and the per capita income of
its people was estimated at $160 (for Sub-Saharan Africa, the current comparable figure is
$745). The aforesaid GDP comprised: Agriculture 67%, services 25% and industry 8% only.(5) The countrys exports, consisting mainly
of livestock, bananas and hides and skins, amounted to a mere $93 million, while its
imports recorded $373 million (i.e., four times as much as its exports). But the country's
economic activities are currently believed to be greatly fueled by remittances from the
Somalis in the Diaspora who are estimated to send to their relatives back home
approximately $360 million annually. However, the second generation of Somali immigrants
(especially those born or raised as youngsters in the highly individualistic West) may not
be so generous with their painstakingly earned money, as one of the World Bank's recent
reports has stated.(6)
On the other hand, thousands upon thousands of Somalis, who are scattered across the
country as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees in neighboring countries,
have left their farms and/or small businesses which were taken over by stronger
clan militias because of insecurity. Besides, there are elements within the faction
leaders/warlords who are not interested in real peace and national reconciliation in
Somalia, because they would, otherwise, have to return the agricultural land, real estate,
houses and businesses that they had illegally confiscated in the past 16 years to their
rightful owners. Sadly, the misguided tribal militias and their bosses, the unscrupulous
warlords, either ignore or dont understand that, according to one of the hadiths
(sayings) of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), it is strictly forbidden to take away
or harm, without legal justification, a fellow Muslims life, his/her property or
his/her personal honor.
According to the World Bank's latest reports,
Somalia's labor force is estimated at 4.6 million (or 56% of the country's total
population estimated at 8.2 million). This figure for labor force comprises 1.6
million in urban centers (or cities and towns) and 3.0 million in rural and nomadic areas.
This labor force is estimated to grow at 3.1% per annum (in other Sub-Saharan Africa, the
growth is 2.3% only). Total employment for this Somali labor force, including paid
employment, self-employment as well as unpaid economically productive household works
among the economically active population is estimated at 39% for urban, 59% for rural and
nomadic population and 53% for the country as a whole. In other words, the
unemployment rate stands at 66% for the urban and 41% for rural and nomadic areas.
This translates to a 47% unemployment rate for Somalia as a whole one of the
highest unemployment rates presently taking place in Sub-Sahara Africa.(7) Stated differently, almost half of Somalias
population is now out of work. (Under normal conditions, if this rate reaches 10% in a
country, it would be considered a big disaster). Here, it is not surprising that the
unemployment rate is significantly higher in urban areas, because when Somalia had a
functioning central government, the overwhelming majority of urban dwellers used to get
paid employment opportunities from the various government institutions (i.e., the civil
service, the police, the national army, etc.) and its autonomous public enterprises. At
present, the economic entities operating in the country mainly consist of
telecommunications (especially telephone) firms, money transfer entities (or hawalas),
water/power distribution firms and petty traders. But these private sector entities are
far from being able to absorb the ever increasing unemployed or under-employed labor
force, particularly young armed males.
Due to the prevalence of severe poverty and
lack of employment opportunities, as indicated earlier, many of the armed young men, who
represent the urban drop-outs, armed thugs and those brought from the countryside and/or
nomadic areas, ostensibly to help their tribesmen - the ruthless worlds - in their war
efforts to assume full control over the government organs by force, pose a particularly
thorny problem. As the world Bank indicated in the above mentioned report, Somali clans
have been competing [and massacring each other, I may add] for the control of the central
government, because it is regarded as the best and easiest way for accumulating wealth
(and not as a public service to work for the good of the Somali people as a whole).
Once these armed tribal militias become
accustomed to the relatively more comfortable life in big cities and towns, they would not
be willing to go back to the harsh, predominantly nomadic environment, they had left
behind many years ago. On the other hand, extreme poverty rate, i.e., people living under
$1 per day (or less than $370 annually), are now estimated to be around 43% in Somalia.
Consequently, the country is not at all expected to realize any of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) which the developing or low income countries are supposed to
achieve, according to the UN plans, by the year 2015. These targets include: Halving
extreme poverty; achieving universal primary education (or 100% enrolment); reducing child
mortality; promoting gender equality (particularly in the education field); improving
maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, etc.
III.
What is to be done?
In the light of the above brief analysis and in
order to address the acute unemployment problem in the country, it would be advisable for
the present government in Somalia (TFG) to take bold steps along the following lines:
(a)
Restoration of law and order:
There is no doubt that restoration of peace, security and stability is the sine qua non
condition for improving the economic situation. Without that, the millions of internally
displaced people as well as Somalis in the Diaspora will not go back to their original
abodes in order to earn livelihood by lawful means in addition to contributing to the
reconstruction of their unlucky country a country that has to start from scratch,
as Somalia is today, in the opinion of some observers, in a much worse situation than
where it was when it gained its independence almost 50 years ago.
(b)
Reconstruction of the Somali Governments
institutions:
Immediate steps are required to be taken to rehabilitate and reconstruct the Somali
Governments institutions (i.e., the civil service, the police, the national army,
public education and health, the essential autonomous public enterprises, etc) as soon as
feasible. If this is accomplished, thousands of Somalis would, in the long-run, get a
chance for obtaining decent jobs with the national government, as was the case before the
collapse of the state machinery in early 1991.
(c)
Provision of lawful employment to the
armed militias:
The illiterate marauding armed young men whom we talked about earlier have to be disarmed,
demobilized and given the opportunity to gain livelihood through lawful means. To achieve
this, the Somali Government is expected to embark upon ambitious public works projects,
i.e., rehabilitating and constructing schools, hospitals, water points (or boreholes),
veterinary centers, roads and other infrastructure components provided, of course,
that the government obtains sufficient funds from both local sources as well as donations
from friendly foreign countries and institutions.
(d)
Opening up vocational training centers:
One way of improving employment chances for the demobilized ex-armed tribal militias would
be to re-open the numerous vocational and technical centers/institutes, which Somalia had
before the start of its tragic civil war, for the purpose of teaching them some basic
technical skills or trades in such areas as: carpentry, plumbing, electric works, car
repairs, etc., for a period not exceeding, say, 1-2 years. Those who don't desire to
engage in these skills, usually needed by the market, could be absorbed in the national
police and army forces that will be formed and consolidated in the near future to
safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia and not annihilating
the Somali people on tribal basis, as was the case in the past two decades or so.
(e)
Encouraging the SMEs:
Another important approach for enhancing employment opportunities and eradicating poverty
could be for the national authorities to encourage and promote small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) to aid, particularly, the poor Somali women, many of whom have been
heading families and have been their only bread-earners as their husbands were either
killed, maimed or engaged in Somalia's senseless fratricidal warfare of the past 20 years
or so.
To achieve this, Somali Government would be advised to revive, as soon as possible, the
banking sector, especially the now defunct Somali Development Bank, in order to extend
loans (preferably soft ones) to the qualified Somali citizens. Over the centuries, Somalis
have been known to be naturally born entrepreneurs who are good, particularly, at engaging
in trade and commerce. (It is a measure of Somalias disintegration and the terrible
destruction of its major institutions that today, in the 21st century, there is no, for
instance, a single ordinary bank or legal service available in the country. This would be
something unfathomable in the civilized world).
(f)
Benefiting from the experience of other
developing countries:
Somalia could greatly benefit from the experience of some other developing countries like
Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in Asia, in the field of poverty reduction
through micro-financing. In particular, useful lessons could be learned from Grameen Bank,
the pioneer of micro-financing, and its chairman, Prof. Muhammad Yunus, the winner of last
years Nobel Prize for Peace in recognition of his considerable contributions to this
field. As some of you may be aware of, this admirable ex-academician had started his
mission extending loans to the Bangladeshi poor, especially, the women, for as little as
$27 per financing operation to start their own small businesses!
Finally, some people may think that the
above-mentioned recommendations or remedies for Somalia's dire unemployment situation are
far-fetched and unrealistic given the country's current situation. (Today, Somalias
government is penniless and on top of that the country had accumulated, before the
collapse of its state, foreign debts currently amounting to nearly US $3 billion).
However, the country cannot forever remain in this senseless civil strife and sooner or
later it will be incumbent upon Somalis to get serious and think about rebuilding their
lives and reconstructing their devastated homeland. It is also reasonable at times to
dream in order to achieve lofty goals like tackling Somalia's current appalling
unemployment situation. This is so, because as an American social worker, a lady by the
name of Jane Addams, put it almost a hundred years ago: "Of all the aspects of social
misery, nothing is so heartbreaking as unemployment."
May God almighty save Somalia and protect her from her own sons.
Mahamud M. Yahye, Ph.D.
e-mail: mm2yahya@yahoo.com
(1) See UN Security Council Resolution [on Somalia] No. 814,
dated March 26, 1993
(2) See Hassan Mahadalla, The Somali Conflict: Clan
Rivalry or the Cabals of a Few?, Horn of Africa Journal, Vol. No. XVI, No.
1-4, Dec. 1998, pp. 163-170
(3) The World Bank, "Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and
Dynamics", January 2005, p.11
(4) I. M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture,
History and Social Institutions (Haan Associates, London, UK, 1993), p.76
(5) See the World Bank, "Somalia Socio-Economic Survey
2003", Chap. 2. See also "Somalia at a Glance", "Somalia County
Profile" and Somalia Millennium Development Goals" in that international
financial institution's website: www.worldbank.org/Somalia
(6) The World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and
Dynamics, op. cit., p. 25
(7) It may be worth mentioning that no
reliable/official data of the countrys economic performance have been
available from Somalia since the collapse of its central government in Jan. 1991. There
are, however, some rudimentary data/statistics from both the self-declared Somaliland
Republic and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland (Somalia).
| The
opinions contained in this article are solely those of the writer, and it does not
represent the editorial opinions of Markacadeey online |
|